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Abstract  
 
This paper investigates the adverse effects of external debt on economic performance. In order to 
cater the issue of errors in mathematical model developed to analyze the correlation, this paper 
deals by performing a hypothetical analysis on economic growth within a country at different 
levels of external debt. The analysis is done on all sectors at the same time to ensure maximum 
accuracy. The paper concludes that debt itself is not an effective way of helping underdeveloped 
countries. This study adds in finding effective means which will allow underdeveloped countries 
to get a foothold on the development ladder of economy. 
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1.  Introduction 
Poverty is one of the most severe problems of the world. It is regarded as the root cause of many 
other major problems the world is facing e.g. crime and corruption. It is therefore the primary 
concern of developed countries to some how eliminate or reduce poverty to some extent to make 
this world a better place to live. In order to do so it is pertinent that the economy of third world 
countries be given economic/financial support to boost their economic growth. Foreign aid and 
debt is one such support given to third world countries so that they can improve the performance 
of their economy which will result in reduction of poverty in the same. Consensus in economics 
and political discussions was for a long time that this was a fair and efficient way of helping 
developing countries, despite early criticism that foreign aid and debt could have such adverse 
economic and political consequences as to negate any beneficial effects [Cline, 1995 and Cohen, 
1993]. The international community continues to rely on foreign aid and debt as its primary 
means of advancing development in the Third World. Existing economic research nevertheless 
gives only limited reason to believe that these worthy goals can be reached through simply 
disbursing more debt to developing countries [Geske Dijkstra and Niels Hermes, 2001]. As 
suggested  by [Maureen, 2001] external debt does not necessarily means that it will improve the 
economy or on the other extreme, as explained by [Rajan, Subramanian, 2005], if debt is not 
properly used for development, will in fact cause long term damage to the economy.  
[Moss, Chiang, 2003] in their studies highlighted that the relationship between external debt and 
economic growth can become complicated for several reasons. First, there is a direct relation 
between the stock of debt and debt servicing which was also highlighted by [Clements et al, 
2003].Then the large debt service requirements dry up foreign exchange and capital, because 
they are transferred to principal and interest payments. Which in turn reduces the budget 
available for development expenditures. Thirdly the debt servicing not only affects the 
development expenditures by the government but the private sectors investment is also impacted 
by it. As a result each sector in the economy faces a decline in this scenario. The private sector 
reluctance in case of high external debt was also highlighted by [Barro, 1990 and Kneller et al, 
1999] in their study. They suggested that private investor are reluctant because they believe if the 
government raises more debt then there is a probability that it will tax away the return on their 
investment in order to service the debt in the future. It is also pertinent that in order to service the 
debt it will increase the cost of capital to generate more revenue and meet its expense. Another 
important thing to mention is that when the debtor countries are unable to meet their debt service 
obligations promptly, the debtor countries will face bad credit status and find it difficult to 
borrow. As a result, debtor countries will pay high rate to obtain new credit [Agénor, 2002]. It is 
worth mentioning that increased precautionary savings caused by higher uncertainty about future 
income may further reduce growth. In the situation of high external debt the economy also 
benefits partially from an increase in output or exports because a fraction of the increase is used 
to service the debt and accrues to creditors [Savvides, 1992]. Finally to obtain more foreign 
exchange to meet debt obligations, many debtor countries reduce imports and trade, this causes 
poor trade performance [Geiger, 1990] 
 
 All the discussion above theoretically suggests that growth of economy is impacted by the level 
of external debt. What we have done in this paper is that we have performed a hypothetical 
analysis to find out the correlation between external debt and economic growth. Instead of 
performing analysis on the overall growth of economy, we have performed our analysis on 
growth of each and every sector of economy. In this way the correlation between them is better 
elaborated. The result of the analysis gives us basis to ascertain authenticity of all the theories 
previously explained. The analysis is performed on economic data of Pakistan for the period 
from 1990 to 2005-6. This era is highlighted with many rises and falls of Pakistan economy 
which gives more ground to perform the analysis and find the correlation. In the next section we 
have briefly discussed the economic and political happenings of this period in Pakistan so that an 
idea can be developed about the situation of economy in this period.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the section 3 briefly reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the debt growth nexus, section 4 presents the data, section 5 presents the 
analysis and section 6 concludes based on the results of the analysis. Appendix ‘A’ presents all 
the figures and appendix ‘B’ tables of dataset used and developed for the analysis.  
 
2.  Background Facts and Figures 
Pakistan economy has witnessed an economic turmoil from the time it came into being. The 
worst situation faced by the country was in the era of 1990 to 1999. But the reforms right after 
these crises are extraordinary and shows that Pakistan has fought back strongly on economic 
grounds. This is the reason why we have selected the era from 1990 to 2005-6, so that we can 
analyze the relation with great variance in the data. All the data given here is taken from Federal 
Bureau of Statistics (Government of Pakistan), Finance Division (Government of Pakistan) and 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 
In 1990, elected government of Pakistan at that time inherited an economy in deep fiscal crisis. 
External debt and liabilities (ED&L) of the country stood at $20.56 billion. The ED&L to forex 
earnings ratio was 257%. The fiscal deficit was as large as 8.5 per cent of the Gross national 
product (GNP). In addition, the decline of remittances and widening trade deficit had worsened 
the balance of payments position. Pakistan approached IMF for the structural adjustment facility 
and accepted the target of reducing the fiscal deficit to 4.8 per cent by 1990-91. However, the 
deficit continued and reached a new peak of 8.7 per cent in 1990-91 despite the disbursement of 
$900 million by the IMF.  
When Pakistan exploded the nuclear bomb in 1998, its trade and balance of payments were in 
disarray. Workers’ remittances have stagnated around the $1 billion mark and the current 
account deficit was $2.5 billion. As the Western countries imposed sanctions on Pakistan and the 
IMF cut off its assistance, the crises in the balance of payments deepened. In 1999 ED&L 
increased to $38.96 billion. The percentage increase in ED&L from 1990 to 1999 was 90%. At 
the same time Foreign Exchange Earnings increased by just $4 billion. As a result ED&L to 
Forex earnings ratio increased to 335%. 
The military government that seized power in 1999 tried to grapple with the worsening economic 
situation. U.S assistance has played a key role in moving Pakistan's economy from the brink of 
collapse to setting record high levels of foreign reserves and exports, dramatically lowering 
levels of solid debt1. During this reform period ED&L has decreased by $2.5 billion in 7 years. 
ED&L as % of GDP which was 64% in 1999 decreased to 28.3% in 2005-6. And ED&L to 
Forex earnings ratio which was 335% in 1999 decreased to 128% in 2005-6. The previous 
discussion shows that there is significant contrast in the performance of economy off these two 
eras which also relates to the level of external debt and liabilities. 
 
3.  Theoretical and Empirical Literature  
In order to carry out the subject study, we first established a hypothesis and then performed the 
hypothetical analysis to come to a conclusion. In this section we have briefed about the 
hypothesis and its mechanics. We also briefed about the different phenomena related to debt i.e  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1Us assistance after the 9/11 has come in many forms. It started with the uplifting of sanctions imposed on Pakistan 
in response to the nuclear blast, rescheduling of debt, provision of foreign aids, extension of foreign trade along with 
USA and other European countries. 
debt overhanging, crowding out effect and macroeconomic uncertainty. 
 
3.1  Hypothetical Analysis 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Statistics often involve a comparison of two values when one or both values are associated with 
some uncertainty. Statistical inference consists of two components, estimation and hypothesis 
testing. Estimation can be carried out on the basis of sample values from a large population. 
Estimation involves the use of summary statistics, including the sample mean and standard 
deviation. In contrast, hypothesis testing enables one to quantify the degree of uncertainty in 
sampling variation, which may account for the results that deviate from the hypothesized values 
in a particular study. The procedure that we have used is the Chi Square test of independence2. 
This test is used to find out whether two populations or variables are related or independent to 
each other with respect to some characteristic. 
3.1.2 Procedure 
A general procedure is that of calculating the probability of observing the difference between 
two values if they really are not different. This probability is called the P value, and this 
condition is called the null hypothesis (H0). On the basis of the P value and whether it is low 
enough, one can conclude that H0 is not true and that there really is a difference. This act of 
conclusion is in some ways a "leap of faith," which is why it is known as statistical significance.  
There are five major steps necessary for conducting a statistical hypothesis test: (a) formulate the 
null (H0) and alternative (Ha) hypotheses, (b) compute the critical value for the given conditions, 
(c) calculate the statistics for the subject data, (d) either reject or do not reject H0 decision based 
on the difference between the critical value and computed value (e) interpret the results. 
3.2  Debt Overhang  
The term “debt overhang” indicates a situation in which a debt is so large that any earnings  
generated by new investment projects are entirely appropriated by existing debt holders, and 
hence even projects with a positive net present value cannot reduce the debt or result in the 
slowing of economic growth which was also highlighted by [Krugman, 1988 and Sachs, 1989]. 
As sovereign governments service their debt by taxing firms and households, high levels of debt 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2Chi square test is a nonparametric hypothesis test. Nonparametric statistical procedures test hypotheses that do not 
require normal distribution or variance assumptions about the populations from which the samples were drawn and 
are designed for ordinal or nominal data 
 
imply an increase in the economic sector’s expected future tax burden. Debt overhang 
characterizes a situation in which this future debt burden is perceived to be so high that it acts as 
a disincentive to current investment [Serven, 1996]. Investors think that the proceeds of any new 
project will be taxed away to service the pre-existing debt. A weaker version requires only 
uncertainty by investors as to whether the government will expropriate the return on their 
investment, or even uncertainty on the part of lenders to investors who may not be sure whether 
their claims will take precedence over or be superseded by the government’s taxing power. 
Lower levels of current investment, in turn, lead to lower growth and, for a given tax rate, lower 
government revenues, lower ability to pay, and lower expected value of the debt. Countries that 
suffer from debt overhang will have no net resource flows because, by definition, any new loan 
that might be issued would be worth less than its nominal value, and no new creditor will be 
willing to lend when a loss is certain.  
 
3.3  Crowding out effect  
In economics, crowding out theoretically occurs when the government expands its borrowing to 
finance increased expenditure or tax reduction, crowding out private sector investment by way of 
higher interest rates [Chowdhury, Hansen, and Clements et al, 2003]. If increased borrowing 
leads to higher interest rates by creating a greater demand for money and loanable funds and 
hence a higher "price", the private sector, which is sensitive to interest rates will likely reduce 
investment due to a lower rate of return. This is the investment that is crowded out [Dornbusch, 
1989]. The weakening of fixed investment and other interest-sensitive expenditure counteracts to 
varying extents the expansionary effect of government deficits. More importantly, a fall in fixed 
investment by business can hurt long-term economic growth of the supply side, i.e., the growth 
of potential output. 
However, this crowding-out effect is moderated by the fact that government spending expands 
the market for private-sector products through the multiplier and thus stimulates – or "crowds in" 
– fixed investment (via the "accelerator effect"). This accelerator effect is most important when 
business suffers from unused industrial capacity, i.e., during a serious recession or a depression. 
Crowding out can, in principle, be avoided if the deficit is financed by simply printing money, 
but this carries concerns of accelerating inflation. Crowding out of another sort may occur due to 
the prevalence of floating exchange rates. Government borrowing leads to higher interest rates, 
which attract inflows of money on the capital account from foreign financial markets into the 
domestic currency (i.e., into assets denominated in that currency). Under floating exchange rates, 
that leads to appreciation of the exchange rate and thus the "crowding out" of domestic exports 
(which become more expensive to those using foreign currency). This counteracts the demand-
promoting effects of government deficits. 
Crowding out is most serious when an economy is already at potential output or full 
employment. Then the government's expansionary fiscal policy encourages increased prices, 
which lead to an increased demand for money. This in turn leads to higher interest rates and 
crowds out interest-sensitive spending. At potential output, businesses are in no need of markets, 
so that there is no room for an accelerator effect. More directly, if the economy stays at full 
employment gross domestic product, any increase in government purchases shifts resources 
away from the private sector. This phenomenon is sometimes called "real" crowding out. 
The negative effects on long-term economic growth that occur when private fixed investment are 
crowded out can be moderated if the government uses its deficit to finance productive investment 
in education, basic research, and the like. The situation is made worse, of course, if the 
government wastes borrowed money. 
 
3.5 Macroeconomic uncertainty 
The poor may also be affected negatively by increased macroeconomic uncertainty and volatility 
due to high indebtedness [Breen, Garcia-Peñalosa, 1999]. Increased precautionary savings 
caused by higher uncertainty about future income may increase poverty due to reduced growth. 
In addition, credit market effects, i.e. higher incidence of credit rationing or increased risk 
premium and borrowing rates for private firms may affect negatively the poor via fallen labor 
demand [Agénor, 2002]. Higher levels of external debt may also increase the propensity of debt 
crisis [Cohen, 1997]. While a financial crisis in itself may impact negatively on the poor 
[Baldacci, de Mello, Inchauste, 2002], debt crisis may additionally affect the income of the poor 
in the longer-run via asymmetric effects, i.e. poverty is less reduced in subsequent expansions 
than increased during contractions. Firstly expectations may be more pessimistic during phases 
of crisis than optimistic in booming times. Secondly, credits may be rationed to firms due to a 
higher perceived risk of default in recessions. This effect may not completely offset during 
expansions. Thirdly, inadequate insurance and credit mechanisms for poorer households may 
prevent the ability to smooth consumption with possible negative effects. Finally, unskilled 
workers may lose their jobs first in recessions if firms “hoard” their skilled labor force due to 
higher turnover costs. During expansions companies may increase fixed investment if 
complementarity between skilled labor and physical capital is high, leading to persistent 
unskilled unemployment [Agénor, 2002]. 
 
 
4 Data 
To be able to test all the propositions given above, we employ data from different sources. Our 
focus of study is the era of economic growth of Pakistan from 1990 to 2005-6. This era is of 
particular interest for economists. With great variations in the level of external debt and 
economic growth of the country, it gives an important basis to develop the model and perform 
the analysis with accuracy. All the data given here is taken from Federal Bureau of Statistics 
(Government of Pakistan), Finance Division (Government of Pakistan) and Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress. Table 1 at appendix ‘B’ gives the GDP of economic sectors of 
Pakistan from 1990 to 2005-6. While table 2 gives the external debt and liabilities from 1990 to 
2005-6 of Pakistan. 
 
5. The Analysis 
To perform the hypothesis test we have used 2χ  (Chi Square) technique. Stepwise analysis is 
given as follows.  
5.1       State Null and Alternative Hypothesis:  
 
In this step we made the assumption that external debt and economic growth is independent of 
each other. This is called null hypothesis and is stated as follow: 
 
Ho:  Economic growth of different sectors within an economy is independent of level of 
external debt and liabilities. 
 
After stating the null hypothesis we state the alternative hypothesis: 
 
Ha:  Economic growth of different sectors within an economy is dependent of level of external 
debt and liabilities. 
 
5.2 Determine Significance level: 
 
We have tested our hypothesis for 95% confidence interval. For 95% confidence interval 
significance level is equal to 5%3.i.e: 
Significance level = α =100% - 95% 
α = 5% 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3The test can also be conducted for significance level greater than 5% i.e α =10%, 15%. But this makes the 
confidence interval smaller i.e confidence interval decreases to 90% and 85% respectively. 
 5.3 Critical values: 
 
The critical value is obtained through consulting the 2χ  table and determining the value of 2χ  
against α  and degree of freedom (df). 
 
Where            df = (r-1) x (c-1) 
r = no. of rows 
c = no. of columns 
 
For the case in hand, r is equal to 10 and c is equal to 15. Therefore:  
 
df = (10-1) x (15-1) 
df = 9 x 14 
df =126 
 
Therefore, for our study the critical value is 158.9624. The critical values, acceptance region and 
rejection region are illustrated in figure 1 at appendix ‘A’. 
 
5.4 Compute value of 2χ : 
 
In order to perform the analysis first we have developed a table that presents GDP of all the 
sectors of economy at different levels of external debt and liabilities. Therefore we have taken 
the GDP of all the sectors in different years from table 1 and external debt and liabilities in the 
same year from table 2 and presented them in table 3 at appendix ‘B’. 
 
5.5   Calculate the Expected Growth: 
 
Table 3 at appendix ‘B’ gives the observed GDP at different levels of external debt. For our 
analysis we have to calculate the expected GDP at different levels of external debt. To calculate 
the expected GDP of a sector at any level of external debt, we multiplied the sum of GDPs of all 
the sectors in a particular column with the sum of the GDPs in a particular row and divided with 
the total sum of GDP of all sectors. Mathematically we can represent the equation as follows: 
E(i,j) = ∑ ∑∑
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c
j
c
i
ji
r
i
ji RowGDPXGDP
1 1
),(
1
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4Critical values can be calculated by looking at the Chi Square table or it can also be found out through scripts in 
which we input the variables and the script generates the distribution graph incorporating critical values. One such 
script can be found here: http://www.fourmilab.ch/rpkp/experiments/analysis/chiCalc.html  
Where “i” represents the row number (economic sector) and “j” represents the column number 
(level of debt). While “r” represents the total number of rows and “c” represents the total 
number of columns. 
For example expected GDP for major crops at EDL level of $ 22.899 billion is calculated as 
follows is as follows: 
E(1,1) = ) of sum(/
1
10
1
),15(
15
1
)10,( ∑∑∑
===
c
ii
j
i
i RowGDPXGDP  
E(1,1)=84.9 X 33.3/676.8 = 4.38 
 
In the same way expected growth for each cell is calculated5. Table 4 at appendix ‘B’ shows the 
expected growth for all the sectors at every level of external debt. In each cell the top value 
represents the observed GDP and bottom value represents the expected GDP of the particular 
sector. 
 
5.6 Calculate difference of expected and observed growth 
 
The difference between observed and expected growth of sectors is calculated by subtracting the 
expected growth calculated in previous step from the observed (given) growth of the 
corresponding row and column. i.e: 
 
Difference = d(i,j)= O(i,j) – E(i,j) 
 
For example the difference between observed and expected growth for major crops at external 
debt level of $ 22.899 billions is as follows: 
 
d(1,1)=-0.1 – 4.177 
d(1,1)=-4.277 
In the same way we calculated the difference of observed and expected growth of each column. 
Table 5 at appendix ‘B’ gives the difference of growth of all columns. 
 
5.7 Calculation of 2χ  
 
After the difference of observed and expected growth has been calculated for each cell, we now 
calculated the value of 2χ  for each cell. 2χ  is calculated by the following formula:  
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5The tables are generated through excel sheet. In the simplest way the expected GDP for first cell is calculated by 
multiplying the sum of first column with sum of first row and dividing with sum of all cells. 
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Where d(i,j) is difference between observed and expected growth. The above formula can be 
further elaborate:  
 
)10,15()10,15()1,3()1,3()1,2()1,2()1,1()1,1( /}2)^....{(/}2)^{(/}2)^{(/}^2){(2 EdEdEdEd +++=χ  
 
2χ ={(0.1-4.17)^2}/4.17+{(5.2-1.1)^2}/1.1+{(6.1-4.53)^2}/4.53+…{(5.4-9.14}^2}/9.14 
 
Table 6 at appendix ‘B’ shows the calculation of 2χ  in the tabular form: 
 
Value of 2χ  of our hypothesis is the sum of all the cells of table 6 i.e: 
∑
==
= cr
ji
ji
,
1,1
22 ),(χχ = 2981.22 
5.8 Evaluate if 2χ  lies in rejection region: 
 
We have already calculated the critical value for 95% confidence interval and degree of freedom 
equal to 126. The value calculated is 158.962. The same is represented in figure 1. The region 
between origin and critical value is called the acceptance region. While any region beyond this 
limit is called the rejection region. The value of 2χ  we calculated in previous step for the subject 
hypothesis is 2981.i.e it lays in the rejection region.  The same can be seen in figure 2 at 
appendix ‘A’. 
 
5.9 Result of the analysis: 
 
If the value of 2χ  we have calculated lies in acceptance region then we accept the null 
hypothesis (H0). But if the value of 2χ  lies in rejection region then we reject the null  hypothesis 
(H0) and accept the alternate (Ha) hypothesis. As evident from figure 2 at appendix ‘A’ the value 
of X2 falls in the rejection region therefore, we reject Null Hypothesis and accept the alternate 
hypothesis. The conclusion of the hypothesis testing can be stated as: 
 
“At 5% significance level the given data does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that 
the growth of economic sectors is independent of level of eternal debt and liabilities. In other 
words with 95% confidence interval we can state that there exists a correlation between growth 
of economic sectors and the level of external debt and liabilities of an economy”. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
This paper underlines the great relevance that high external debts have on economic 
performance. By testing the null hypothesis stating that performance of economy is independent 
of the level of external debt we conclude that at 5 % significance level the evidence doesn’t 
suggest so i.e: performance of economy depends on the level of external debt. The analysis 
justifies the poor economic performance of Pakistan at the high level of external debt and a better 
economic performance at lower level of external debt. This analysis confirms to the theoretical 
concept of economy which suggests a strong relation between these two. Although the cause of 
the low growth due to the external debt may not be reflected in this paper but it underlines the 
great relevance that debt issues have in Low-Income countries and investigate the adverse effect 
that a large indebtedness has on the rate of economic growth. Hence in the light of the analysis 
we can say that giving debt to countries is likely to fail the target of helping the world‘s poorest 
countries to have a foothold on the development ladder.  Therefore debt relief, instead, could be 
a way to start a new path of economic growth, because it reduce debt overhang, crowding out  
and uncertainty and it could also foster the development of sound institutions and the 
implementation of growth and market oriented policies, that are the main determinant of 
economic growth. In order to further proceed with the study, the analysis that we have adopted 
here can also be used in order to find the correlation of Socio-Economic indicators e.g. poverty, 
unemployment, inflation, literacy, crime etc with the growth of the economy. Having found the 
strong correlation of growth with external debt, we can either correlate these Socio-Economic 
indicators indirectly with debt or can perform the analysis directly between these indicators and 
debt. 
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Figure 1: Critical Value for α=5% and DF=126
Figure 2: X2 Statistics for the hypothesis H0
Appendix B: Tables 
 
  
  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)   
(1990-2005-6) 
Year 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sector                     
1. Agriculture                      
i. Major Crops  -0.1 8.7 -4.3 0 15.4 -9.9 -2.5 6.8 1.9 17.3 
ii. Minor Crops  5.2 6.9 0.9 4.2 -9.1 -3.2 -3.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 
iii. Livestock  6.1 5.5 4.2 3.2 1.9 3.8 3.7 2.6 2.8 2.3 
iv. Fishing  8.2 -7.3 4.8 0.6 9.7 -3 -12.3 3.4 2 2.1 
v. Forestry  9.7 1.6 10.5 0 113 9.1 -4.4 11.1 -5.5 0.4 
2. Industry                      
i. Mining & Quarrying  4.7 -4.3 1.9 3.2 6.2 -1.7 7.3 16.1 3.8 5 
ii. Manufacturing  8.4 -2.4 -0.1 4.1 1.5 9.3 4.5 6.9 14.1 12.5 
iii. Construction  3.1 1 1.1 -4.9 5.2 0.5 1.6 4 -6.9 6.2 
iv. Electricity and Gas Distribution  14.6 16.8 -2.9 17.4 -3 -13.7 -7 -11.7 21.1 2.1 
3. Services                      
i. Transport, Storage & Communication 
  
6.5 
  
4.1 
  
3.8 
  
5.1 
  
3.6 
  
5.3 
  
1.2 
  
4.3 
  
5.5 
  
5.6 
ii. Wholesale and Retail Trade  3.5 4.6 0.7 3 1.9 4.5 2.8 6 8.1 12 
iii. Finance and Insurance  0.5 6.3 11.5 18.9 -4.1 -15.1 17.2 -1.3 4.5 21.8 
iv. Ownership of Dwellings  5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.5 
v. Public Administration & Defense  2.7 3.1 2.2 2.5 9.4 2.2 6.9 7.7 4.2 -0.8 
vi. Community, S & P Services  6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.6 7.9 6.2 5.2 5.4 
Table 1: Real GDP of economic sectors of Pakistan from 1990 to 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: External Debt and Liabilities of Pakistan from 1990 to 2005 
 
  
  GDP at different levels of ED&L 
Year 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
External Debt & 
Liabilities($ billions) 22.9 37.2 42.4 38.9 37.9 37.1 36.5 35.5 35.2 35.8  
Sector                      Total 
1. Agriculture                        
i. Major Crops  -0.1 8.7 -4.3 0 15.4 -9.9 -2.5 6.8 1.9 17.3 33.3 
ii. Minor Crops  5.2 6.9 0.9 4.2 -9.1 -3.2 -3.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 8.8 
iii. Livestock  6.1 5.5 4.2 3.2 1.9 3.8 3.7 2.6 2.8 2.3 36.1 
iv. Fishing  8.2 -7.3 4.8 0.6 9.7 -3 -12.3 3.4 2 2.1 8.2 
v. Forestry  9.7 1.6 10.5 0 113 9.1 -4.4 11.1 -5.5 0.4 145.5 
2. Industry                        
i. Mining & Quarrying  4.7 -4.3 1.9 3.2 6.2 -1.7 7.3 16.1 3.8 5 42.2 
ii. Manufacturing  8.4 -2.4 -0.1 4.1 1.5 9.3 4.5 6.9 14.1 12.5 58.8 
iii. Construction  3.1 1 1.1 -4.9 5.2 0.5 1.6 4 -6.9 6.2 10.9 
iv. Electricity and Gas 
Distribution  14.6 16.8 -2.9 17.4 -3 -13.7 -7 -11.7 21.1 2.1 33.7 
3. Services                        
i. Transport, Storage and                        
Communication  6.5 4.1 3.8 5.1 3.6 5.3 1.2 4.3 5.5 5.6 45 
  External Debt & Liabilities (ED&L)           
(1990 – 2005-6) 
Year 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
External Debt & 
Liabilities  
( $ billions) 22.9 37.2 42.4 38.9 37.9 37.1 36.5 35.5 35.2 35.8 
ii. Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  3.5 4.6 0.7 3 1.9 4.5 2.8 6 8.1 12 47.1 
iii. Finance and 
Insurance  0.5 6.3 11.5 18.9 -4.1 -15.1 17.2 -1.3 4.5 21.8 60.2 
iv. Ownership of 
Dwellings  5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.5 44.1 
v. Public Administration 
& Defense  2.7 3.1 2.2 2.5 9.4 2.2 6.9 7.7 4.2 -0.8 40.1 
vi. Community, S & P 
Services  6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.6 7.9 6.2 5.2 5.4 62.8 
Total 84.9 56.4 46.1 69.1 163.4 -2.5 26.7 67.3 66.9 98.5 676.8 
Table 3: Real GDP of economic sectors at different level of external debt and liabilities 
 
  
  Observed (Oi) & Expected (Ei) GDP 
Year 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
External Debt & 
Liabilities ( $ billions ) 22.9 37.2 42.4 38.9 37.9 37.1 36.5 35.5 35.2 35.8 
Sector                     
1. Agriculture                      
i. Major Crops  -0.1 8.7 -4.3 0 15.4 -9.9 -2.5 6.8 1.9 17.3 
  4.177 2.775 2.268 3.4 8.04 -0.123 1.314 3.311 3.292 4.846 
ii. Minor Crops  5.2 6.9 0.9 4.2 -9.1 -3.2 -3.7 1.9 2.6 3.1 
  1.104 0.733 0.599 0.898 2.125 -0.033 0.347 0.875 0.87 1.281 
iii. Livestock  6.1 5.5 4.2 3.2 1.9 3.8 3.7 2.6 2.8 2.3 
  4.529 3.008 2.459 3.686 8.716 -0.133 1.424 3.59 3.568 5.254 
iv. Fishing  8.2 -7.3 4.8 0.6 9.7 -3 -12.3 3.4 2 2.1 
  1.029 0.683 0.559 0.837 1.98 -0.03 0.323 0.815 0.811 1.193 
v. Forestry  9.7 1.6 10.5 0 113 9.1 -4.4 11.1 -5.5 0.4 
v. Forestry  18.25 12.13 9.911 14.86 35.13 -0.537 5.74 14.47 14.38 21.18 
2. Industry                      
i. Mining & Quarrying  4.7 -4.3 1.9 3.2 6.2 -1.7 7.3 16.1 3.8 5 
  5.294 3.517 2.874 4.309 10.19 -0.156 1.665 4.196 4.171 6.142 
ii. Manufacturing  8.4 -2.4 -0.1 4.1 1.5 9.3 4.5 6.9 14.1 12.5 
  7.376 4.9 4.005 6.003 14.2 -0.217 2.32 5.847 5.812 8.558 
iii. Construction  3.1 1 1.1 -4.9 5.2 0.5 1.6 4 -6.9 6.2 
  1.367 0.908 0.742 1.113 2.632 -0.04 0.43 1.084 1.077 1.586 
iv. Electricity and Gas 
Distribution  14.6 16.8 -2.9 17.4 -3 -13.7 -7 -11.7 21.1 2.1 
  4.227 2.808 2.295 3.441 8.136 -0.124 1.329 3.351 3.331 4.905 
3. Services                      
i. Transport, Storage and                      
Communication  6.5 4.1 3.8 5.1 3.6 5.3 1.2 4.3 5.5 5.6 
  5.645 3.75 3.065 4.594 10.86 -0.166 1.775 4.475 4.448 6.549 
ii. Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  3.5 4.6 0.7 3 1.9 4.5 2.8 6 8.1 12 
  5.908 3.925 3.208 4.809 11.37 -0.174 1.858 4.684 4.656 6.855 
iii. Finance and 
Insurance  0.5 6.3 11.5 18.9 -4.1 -15.1 17.2 -1.3 4.5 21.8 
  7.552 5.017 4.101 6.146 14.53 -0.222 2.375 5.986 5.951 8.761 
iv. Ownership of 
Dwellings  5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.5 
  5.532 3.675 3.004 4.503 10.65 -0.163 1.74 4.385 4.359 6.418 
v. Public Administration 
& Defense  2.7 3.1 2.2 2.5 9.4 2.2 6.9 7.7 4.2 -0.8 
  5.03 3.342 2.731 4.094 9.681 -0.148 1.582 3.987 3.964 5.836 
vi. Community, S & P 
Services  6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.6 7.9 6.2 5.2 5.4 
  7.878 5.233 4.278 6.412 15.16 -0.232 2.477 6.245 6.208 9.14 
Total 84.9 56.4 46.1 69.1 163.4 -2.5 26.7 67.3 66.9 98.5 
Table 4: Observed & Expected GDP at different levels of external debt 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Difference of Observed  & Expected  GDP     
d = Oi- Ei 
Year 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
External Debt & 
Liabilities ( $ billions ) 22.9 37.2 42.4 38.9 37.9 37.1 36.5 35.5 35.2 35.8 
Sector                     
1. Agriculture                      
i. Major Crops  -4.277 5.925 -6.568 -3.4 7.36 -9.777 -3.814 3.489 -1.392 12.45 
ii. Minor Crops  4.096 6.167 0.301 3.302 -11.22 -3.167 -4.047 1.025 1.73 1.819 
iii. Livestock  1.571 2.492 1.741 -0.486 -6.816 3.933 2.276 -0.99 -0.768 -2.954 
iv. Fishing  7.171 -7.983 4.241 -0.237 7.72 -2.97 -12.62 2.585 1.189 0.907 
v. Forestry  -8.552 -10.53 0.589 -14.86 77.87 9.637 -10.14 -3.368 -19.88 -20.78 
2. Industry                      
i. Mining & Quarrying  -0.594 -7.817 -0.974 -1.109 -3.988 -1.544 5.635 11.9 -0.371 -1.142 
ii. Manufacturing  1.024 -7.3 -4.105 -1.903 -12.7 9.517 2.18 1.053 8.288 3.942 
iii. Construction  1.733 0.092 0.358 -6.013 2.568 0.54 1.17 2.916 -7.977 4.614 
iv. Electricity and Gas 
Distribution  10.37 13.99 -5.195 13.96 -11.14 -13.58 -8.329 -15.05 17.77 -2.805 
3. Services                      
i. Transport, Storage and  
Communication 0.855 0.35 0.735 0.506 -7.264 5.466 -0.575 -0.175 1.052 -0.949 
ii. Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  -2.408 0.675 -2.508 -1.809 -9.471 4.674 0.942 1.316 3.444 5.145 
iii. Finance and 
Insurance  -7.052 1.283 7.399 12.75 -18.63 -14.88 14.83 -7.286 -1.451 13.04 
iv. Ownership of 
Dwellings  -0.232 1.625 2.296 0.797 -5.347 3.963 1.76 -1.085 -0.859 -2.918 
v. Public Administration 
& Defense  -2.33 -0.242 -0.531 -1.594 -0.281 2.348 5.318 3.713 0.236 -6.636 
vi. Community, S & P 
Services  -1.378 1.267 2.222 0.088 -8.662 5.832 5.423 -0.045 -1.008 -3.74 
Table 5: Differences of Observed & Expected growth of economic sectors 
 
  
  Independent values of 2χ  for all sectors  
Year 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
External Debt & 
Liabilities ( $  billions ) 22.9 37.2 42.4 38.9 37.9 37.1 36.5 35.5 35.2 35,834 
Sector                     
1. Agriculture                      
i. Major Crops  4.38 12.65 19.02 3.40 6.74 -777.12 11.07 3.68 0.59 32.00 
ii. Minor Crops  15.20 51.86 0.15 12.13 59.30 -308.65 47.18 1.20 3.44 2.58 
iii. Livestock  0.55 2.06 1.23 0.06 5.33 -116.02 3.64 0.27 0.17 1.66 
iv. Fishing  50.00 93.27 32.21 0.07 30.11 -291.16 492.60 8.19 1.75 0.69 
v. Forestry  4.01 9.14 0.04 14.86 172.63 -172.82 17.91 0.78 27.49 20.38 
2. Industry                      
i. Mining & Quarrying  0.07 17.37 0.33 0.29 1.56 -15.30 19.07 33.77 0.03 0.21 
ii. Manufacturing  0.14 10.88 4.21 0.60 11.35 -417.02 2.05 0.19 11.82 1.82 
iii. Construction  2.20 0.01 0.17 32.49 2.51 -7.25 3.18 7.85 59.07 13.42 
iv. Electricity and Gas 
Distribution  25.45 69.71 11.76 56.63 15.24 -1480.48 52.19 67.60 94.78 1.60 
3. Services                      
i. Transport, Storage and                     
Communication  0.13 0.03 0.18 0.06 4.86 -179.76 0.19 0.01 0.25 0.14 
ii. Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  0.98 0.12 1.96 0.68 7.89 -125.57 0.48 0.37 2.55 3.86 
iii. Finance and 
Insurance  6.58 0.33 13.35 26.46 23.89 -995.39 92.54 8.87 0.35 19.40 
iv. Ownership of 
Dwellings  0.01 0.72 1.76 0.14 2.69 -96.41 1.78 0.27 0.17 1.33 
v. Public Administration 
& Defense  1.08 0.02 0.10 0.62 0.01 -37.22 17.88 3.46 0.01 7.55 
vi. Community, S & P 
Services  0.24 0.31 1.15 0.00 4.95 -146.62 11.87 0.00 0.16 1.53 
Table 6: Values of 2χ  calculated for all economic sectors  
